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I.

Abstract

Across the country, African American defendants are being discriminated against in the
criminal courts and by juries, particularly in capital cases.1 This assertion is supported by two
lines of research. First, an analysis of Supreme Court decisions focusing on the racial impact on
voir dire. Second, social-legal studies on juror decision making have demonstrated legal and
socio-legal histories providing evidence that demonstrate there is a racial bias in our system.
Based on these findings, this paper sets forth several legal and policy recommendations to
improve the fair adjudication of African American defendants charged with capital crimes.

1

Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin, Kimberly B. Kahn, Possibility of death sentence has divergent effect on verdicts for
black and white defendants 39 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 539 (2015).
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II.

Introduction

In the words of Clarence Darrow, a famous American trial attorney from the early 20th
century, “almost every case has been won or lost when the jury is sworn.”2 As such, exploring
the biases of potential jurors is essential because juror bias, not evidence, may sway verdicts and
result in injustice. This is especially important in capital punishment cases where the finality of
death is imposed.
The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution protect defendants’ rights,
including the right to a fair and impartial jury.3 Specifically, the Sixth Amendment ensures that
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury.”4 As courts review the constitutionality of topics such as the jury selection,
they determine their interpretations within the context of the Sixth Amendment by determining
whether an impartial jury was formed and through the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to ensure equal protection for any citizen, regardless of race.5 Lastly, the Eighth
Amendment guarantees protection from cruel and unusual punishment and is the basis for the
debate concerning whether or not the death penalty should be imposed.6
Throughout history, juries have been selected in order to create a fair and impartial jury. At
common law, jurors were required to be impartial – individuals capable of being unaffected by
external pressures and internal biases.7 In 1895, the Supreme Court defined the job of the jury

2

Judge Robert M. Dow Jr., Eric Andrews, Laverne Morris, Selecting a Jury can be Complicated During Divisive
Political Times 1 (June 2018).
3
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
4
U.S. Const. Amend. VI.
5
U.S. Const. Amend. VI; See also, U. S. Const. amend. XIV.
6
U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.
7
Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury, 100 (1994).
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by holding that jurors must follow the court’s instructions rather than taking both the facts of the
case and the law into their own hands.8 Through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, all
criminal trials required a jury that could not be waived for reasons relating to public policy; this
changed in 1930 when the Court held that the right to a jury trial may be waived by a
defendant.9 However, when a defendant elects to participate in a jury trial, the jury must be one
that is fair to the defendant. The Supreme Court held in 1975 that the constitutional right to trial
by jury “required that the jury pool be a mirror image or microcosm of the eligible community
population.”10 These together create a very specific idea of what a constitutional jury for any
given trial should look like – reflective of whatever community the defendant is to be tried in. To
contrast, another idea on constitutional jury composition creates a jury that attempts to
encompass fairness – a democratic cross-sectional jury.11 The goal of this kind of jury is to bring
about diverse ideas and even biases to be used during deliberation.12 Through this form of juries,
one juror might bring a perspective that another would not otherwise be exposed to. This
becomes very significant at trial because of the great impact of jury composition on the outcome
of trial. The process of creating a diverse jury composition is accomplished through jury
selection.
Judges and attorneys play a significant role in determining the composition of juries.
Through voir dire, parties can eliminate prospective jurors who are unfit to serve as jurors, while
also ensuring that the population of the jury is composed of jurors who are not biased against

8

Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1985).
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 308 (1930).
10
Id. at 100.
11
Id. at 101.
12
Id.
9
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either side. The question to be answered upon review is whether jury selection based on race
should be allowed in death penalty cases, where the punishment is so severe and so permanent
that there is no room for error.
The implications of research on the implications of juror decision making on the outcome of
trial go beyond that of our legal system and delve into the need for social reform with regards to
African American defendants. Research into sociology and psychology with regard to these
kinds of cases will force both our legal system and our country to acknowledge that African
Americans have been and continue to be discriminated against throughout the history of the
United States legal system. As more researchers begin to make inquiries and face these issues
head on, the closer our legal system will be to reforming those issues.
This thesis will examine constitutional decisions on racial discrimination, the impact of race
on capital punishment decision making and come to conclusions about the corrective measures
that should be implemented to reduce bias. Part III reviews the history of Supreme Court rulings
on the death penalty through examining the history of the death penalty, landmark cases on the
death penalty, and contemporary issues with the death penalty. Part IV analyzes the process of
decision making by identifying three concepts that tend to affect the outcome of a capital trial for
African American defendants: the race of the defendant, the race of the victim, and the quantity
of evidence offered at trial. Part V discusses research that may lead to reforming jury selection in
capital cases. Part VI comes to conclusions about racial biases and jury selection.
This thesis concludes that first the Supreme Court must allow voir dire based on racial biases.
Second, this thesis concludes that the jury for African American defendants must be racially
diverse jury composition in order for the defendant to receive a fair and just trial.

7

III.

Review of Supreme Court Rulings on the Death Penalty
History of the Death Penalty

The legal controversy surrounding the death penalty is rooted in the Eighth Amendment
protection from cruel and unusual punishment.13 The Eight Amendment states: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”
By reviewing cases on the death penalty, the Supreme Court states its interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment in its holdings.
There are two schools of thought when it comes to the interpretation of the Constitution:
originalism and a living constitution. Under the idea of a living constitution, the Eighth
Amendment is vague for the very purpose of it being altered and changed along with the culture
of our country and what is deemed to be “cruel and unusual.” As the ideas of morality and
normality change throughout time, as does the applicability of this amendment to crime and
punishment in our country. It is then up to the courts to decide how to apply the Eighth
Amendment to these principles. According to originalist ideas, however, the words of the
forefathers and what they intended at that time in history is how the Constitution should be
interpreted today. Under this idea, the Eighth Amendment must be construed according to what
the intent of the forefathers was in creating this amendment.
The death penalty has been part of American culture for centuries, dating back to the
1700s.14 Influenced by early political policy and strong Christian ideals, the Framers of the
Constitution considered the ramifications of the death penalty, advocating for its use in only the

13

U.S. Const. Amend. XIII.
Lyn Suzanne Entzeroth, The End of the Beginning: The Politics of Death and the American Death Penalty Regime
in the Twenty-First Century, 90 OR. L. REV. 797 (2012).
14
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most serious of cases.15 This ideal was put into practice around the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries, when the court system began to reject the British practices of mandatory death
penalty.16 Since then, the death penalty has been used in only the most serious of cases with very
careful discretion used to put someone to death for his or her crimes.17 Some states, such as
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Iowa and Maine, abolished the death penalty entirely.18 During the
earliest part of the twentieth century, many states abolished the death penalty; however, this
progressive movement did not last long.19 Within the next decade, half of those reinstated the
death penalty, turning back the clock on capital punishment reform.20 Even after narrowing the
use of the death penalty, the practice has only evolved and brought about controversy that is still
heavily debated.
In 1972, the Supreme Court reviewed the death penalty for three cases within the context
of the Eighth Amendment in Furman v. Georgia.21 In this case, three men were sentenced to
death for murder in Georgia, rape in Georgia, and rape in Texas, respectively.22 Each case was a
trial by jury.23 The Court held that because the death penalty was applied arbitrarily or in a
discriminatory way, “the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eight and Fourteenth
Amendments.”24 The Court reasoned that in many cases, the death penalty is applied to people in

15

Id. at 797.
Id. at 802.
17
Id. at 803.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
22
Id. at 240.
23
Id.
24
Id. at 242.
16
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poverty and African American defendants.25 This is evident in cases with co-defendants in
Texas, the state where one petitioner was sentenced to death.26 In 16% of Texas cases with codefendants, the defendants received separate trials, allowing for different sentencing.27 In many
cases, white co-defendants would receive life imprisonment while their black counterpart would
receive the death penalty.28 By holding that the death penalty could not be applied arbitrarily or
in a manner that is discriminatory, the court took the first step to addressing the arbitrariness that
leads to the incarceration of men and women on death row, including thousands of African
American men.

Landmark Cases on Jury Selection and Race
Over the course of time, the Supreme Court has grappled with the appropriate procedural
safeguards surrounding voir dire, especially concerning racial biases. An early case that focused
on racial prejudice in jury selection was Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981).29 In this case, the
Court held that racial prejudice (here involving a Mexican defendant) may be explored in voir
dire if two prongs are satisfied: 1) the crime is one of violence, and 2) the defendant and victim
are members of different racial or ethnic groups.30 In the Rosales-Lopez case, Humberto RosalesLopez participated in a plan, along with a white female, to illegally bring three Mexican aliens
over the border.31 Before trial, Rosalez-Lopez’s attorney requested voir dire concerning

25

Id. at 249-250.
Id. at 251.
27
Id. at 251.
28
Id.
29
Rosalez-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
30
Id. at 192.
31
Id. at 184.
26
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prejudice towards Mexicans.32 This request was denied.33 Instead, the trial judge questioned
potential jurors about their feelings and prejudices towards immigration and aliens. 34 With
regard to its holding, the Court reasoned that the process of voir dire must be left to the
discretion of the trial judge. The only time that a trial judge must question prospective jurors is in
cases where issues of race and prejudice are so readily apparent throughout the course of the case
that there is a substantial likelihood of racial prejudice infiltrating the minds and passions of the
jury.35 It is important to note that this likelihood is not a small likelihood or a mere possibility;
the courts found it necessary for questioning if and only if there is a heavily weighing possibility
of prejudice. This created a very narrow set of circumstances that allowed for questioning based
on the racial biases of prospective jurors. The Rosalez-Lopez case was not a capital case, but still
set forth the precedent for deciding how jury selection may be conducted.
The Supreme Court awarded more latitude during voir dire for African American defendants
in 1986 when deciding the landmark case of Turner v. Murray.36 This case held that voir dire
that questioned the racial prejudices of prospective jurors may be allowed in capital punishment
cases.37 In this case, a black man was indicted for shooting and killing a white man in the course
of a robbery in Virginia.38 The question on appeal was whether the court erred in allowing for
voir dire based on racial prejudice.39 The Court concluded that “a defendant accused of an
interracial capital crime is entitled to have prospective jurors informed of the victim’s race and

32

Id. at 185.
Id. at 186-187.
34
Id. at 186.
35
Id. at 182.
36
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
37
Id. at 28.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 29.
33
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questioned on the issue of racial bias.”40 The Supreme Court reasoned that because the crime was
interracial and sought to impose the death penalty, voir dire based on racial prejudice should be
allowed, and the court did not err in doing so.41
When deciding Turner v. Murray, the Supreme Court looked back at prior rulings including
Ristaino v. Ross, decided in 1976. In the Ristaino case, the Court held essentially the opposite of
Turner v. Murray; the court held that jury selection that involves questioning on racial prejudice
would not be allowed.42 Although the Turner majority considered the Ristaino holding, the Court
did not overturn Ristaino. Ristaino and Turner both involved a violent crime involving a
defendant and victim of different races, but the Court declined to use this as the reasoning for its
holding in Turner v. Murray. Instead, the Court noted that the difference between Ristaino v.
Ross and Turner v. Murray is the sentence of death.43 Ristaino may still be applicable to other
cases in holding that voir dire of prospective jurors based on race is unnecessary, but the Court
held it is not applicable where a defendant faces the imposition of death, like in Turner v.
Murray.44 Because the sentence of death is so severe and permanent, Turner v. Murray held that
voir dire based on race would be allowed at that level of punishment.45 This case, decided in
1986, was yet another step towards eliminating the discrimination faced by African American
defendants who risk the penalty of death at sentencing.

40

Id. at 28.
Id. at 33-35.
42
Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
43
Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
44
424 U.S. 589 (1976). See also, 476 U.S. 28 (1986).
45
476 U.S. 28 (1986).
41
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Current Legal Issues with the Death Penalty
During voir dire, either party may challenge prospective jurors through one of two
methods: peremptory challenge or challenge for cause. A challenge for cause is a challenge of a
potential juror that has a bias against the defendant or other reason that they may not be impartial
throughout the case.46 Challenges for cause are unlimited throughout the process of voir dire
because it is the defendant’s right to a constitutional trial with a jury free of bias.47 To contrast,
peremptory challenges are challenges of a prospective juror that may be made without giving a
reason.48 In capital cases, both parties are permitted twenty peremptory challenges.49 However,
there are certain exclusions to the ability of a party to excuse a juror without reason including
challenge based on race, gender, or membership in a distinctive group.50
At the heart of issues with jury selection is the prosecutor.51 Prosecutorial misconduct is
an area of law that is harder to reverse, especially when it comes to unconstitutional voir dire,
due to the substantial errors involved.52 When considering other facets of law, there are easier
solutions.53 Evidence found on faulty grounds or a coerced confession can be thrown out with a
motion to suppress. To contrast, when a prosecutor commits an unconstitutional use of
peremptory challenges, the case ends in a reversal or a dismissal of charges.54 Improper

46

47 AM. JUR. 2D Challenges to Jurors for Cause, Generally § 193 (2020).
Id. § 193.
48
47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury Number of Peremptory Challenges to Jurors § 200.
49
Id. § 200.
50
47 AM. JUR. 2D JURY § 206; See also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 207; See also 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury § 208.
51
Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713 (1999).
52
Id. at 717-18.
53
Id. at 715.
54
Id. at 717-18.
47
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peremptory challenges are one of the few areas of misconduct in which the court considers
intent.55
The concept of “unconstitutional jury selection” stems from the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment applying due process to the states. The Equal Protection Clause
provides that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”56 To make
decisions about the constitutionality of challenges conducted during jury selection, the Court
must look to the Equal Protection Clause and consider its interpretation of the law as it applies to
cases before the Court.
Unconstitutional peremptory challenges had been brought up to the court on appeal multiple
times by 1995. However, rather than limiting the prosecutor’s ability to exclude jurors in a way
that was unconstitutional, the Court took a step backwards. The decision in Purkett v. Elem made
it easier for prosecutors to arbitrarily exclude jurors. In the Purkett case, the prosecutor excluded
a prospective juror based on the appearance of his hair and facial hair.57 The Court held that the
reasonableness of a race-neutral reason for excluding a prospective juror is not a factor that must
be considered in determining whether the exclusion should be allowed.58 For this reason, raceneutral explanations given by prosecutors do not need to be “persuasive, or even plausible.”59
When the courts first began addressing the issue of unconstitutional jury selection, a
defendant claiming his or her rights were violated through improper peremptory challenges

55

Id. at 718.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV.
57
Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
58
Id. at 764-765.
59
Id. at 768.
56
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needed to prove a consistent pattern of racial discrimination by the prosecuting attorney.60
Because of the absurdly high burden of proof, the Court reconsidered its holding by changing the
test used to determine a violation of the defendant’s rights through the jury selection process.
The Supreme Court decided Batson v. Kentucky in 1986, a landmark case aimed at
remedying the problem of racial discrimination through jury selection.61 Although this case was
not a capital case, it set forth a remedy for both capital cases and cases that do not involve the
death penalty. In Batson, the prosecutor used four peremptory strikes to excuse all members of
the jury who were black.62 The defendant was also black.63 When deciding this case, the court
looked back to its holding in Swain v. Alabama, determining that the holding in Swain v.
Alabama was inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution.64 In altering the
outcome of their previous case law, the court held a number of new requirements for both
prosecutors and defendants when considering violations of the Equal Protection Clause in voir
dire;
1. The Equal Protection clause protects a defendant from exclusion of the members of his
own race from the jury, for reasons based solely on race.65
2. Although prosecutors are entitled to peremptory challenges without cause, a defendant is
entitled to jury selection that is not based on race.66 No juror may be struck on the for the
lone reason of that particular juror belonging to the same race as the defendant.67

60

Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
62
Id. at 79.
63
Id.
64
380 U.S. at 202.
65
476 U.S. at 79.
66
Id. at 79.
67
Id.
61
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The court also altered the test for determining whether there was been a violation of the Equal
Protections Clause.68 To establish a prima facie case, a defendant must:
1. Show the defendant is part of a recognizable racial group and that the prosecutor has made
an attempt to excuse prospective jurors of that racial group.69
2. The facts and circumstances all point to the reasonable inference that the prosecutor has
made an unethical attempt at excluding members of the jury based on their race in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause.70
Once this standard of a prima facie case has been met, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to
identify a race-neutral reason for striking each prospective juror that was excused with a
peremptory challenge.71 In the Court’s opinion, the Court listed four main arguments that may
not be used by a prosecutor to meet the burden of proof.
1. The defendant need not show a pattern or history of such conduct and may use the
facts laid out by the prosecutor in that case alone.72
2. The inference that a black juror may favor a black defendant is not sufficient
reasoning for striking a black prospective juror.73
3. Peremptory challenges with the sole basis of discrimination and eliminating
members of a particular race will not be justified, even if they are equally applied to
white jurors, black jurors, and any other race alike.74

68

Id. at 80.
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 80.
72
Id. at 97.
73
Id. at 80.
74
Id. at 122.
69
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4. The fact that both the state and defense may use racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges is not a reason that a prosecutor may use to justify their use of
discriminatory exclusion of prospective jurors.75
The court, based on the prima facie case and the reasoning of the prosecutor, will then
determine whether there is what is known now as a Batson violation.76
The Court extended the holdings in Batson five years later in deciding Powers v. Ohio.77
After Batson, parties primarily objected to excluding prospective jurors of the defendant’s own
race.78 In Powers v. Ohio, the Court extended its ruling by holding that a Batson violation claim
could be raised regardless of if the prospective jurors eliminated were of a dissimilar race to the
defendant. The Court reasoned that “to bar a petitioner’s claim because his race differs from that
of the excluded jurors would “condone the arbitrary exclusion of citizens from the duty, honor,
and privilege of jury service.”79
The Batson test is still the test used when there is a claim that a defendant’s Equal Protection
rights have been violated throughout jury selection through discriminatory peremptory strikes. In
June of 2019, the Supreme Court used the Batson test to decide Flowers v. Mississippi, one of
the most recent cases regarding jury selection, racial discrimination and the death penalty.80 The
Supreme Court held that, in the sixth trial of defendant Curtis Flowers, the state prosecutor
committed a Batson violation during pre-trial jury selection.81

75

Id. at 125-26.
Id. at 98.
77
Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991).
78
Id. at 405.
79
Id. at 415.
80
Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228 (2019).
81
Id. at 2235.
76
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In 1996, Curtis Flowers killed four employees at the Tardy Furniture Store in Mississippi.82
Out of four victims, three victims were white. Flowers is a black defendant.83 Since 1996, Curtis
Flowers has been through a total of six trials, each involving prosecutorial misconduct, Batson
violations, and mistrials.84 The sixth trial came before the Supreme Court on appeal with the
question: Were the State’s reasons for peremptory challenge of five black jurors race-neutral?
The Court was to determine whether the State committed yet another Batson violation in the
prosecution of Curtis Flowers. The Court reversed the decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court
and held that, yes, the state prosecutor did violate Batson.85
The Supreme Court reached its ruling for four main reasons. First, the Supreme Court
looked to the prosecutor’s history of peremptory challenges in Flowers’ case.86 Of the 36
prospective jurors, the state attempted to strike every one of them throughout jury selection in the
Flowers’ first four trials.87 Because of this, the state courts upheld a finding of a Batson violation
on the part of the state twice.88 Second, there was a clear pattern in the way the state conducted
jury selection.89 In both the first four trials and the sixth trial, the state attempted to rid the jury of
black jurors and create a jury that was entirely white.90 Third, the ratio of time spent on black
versus white jurors was shockingly disproportionate; one hundred and forty-five questions were
asked of the five black jurors while a mere twelve questions were asked to a total of eleven white

82

Id. at 2228.
Id.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 2235.
86
Id. at 2228.
87
Id. at 2236.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
83
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jurors.91 Lastly, the state exercised peremptory challenges on black jurors with faulty, inaccurate
reasoning. In some instances, the state claimed to strike black jurors for knowing defense
witnesses and members of Flowers’ family.92 This reasoning may sound justifiable standing
alone; however, a number of white prospective jurors had relationships with both the defense
witnesses and the defendant’s family without being questioned on this matter, let alone stricken
as jurors.93
When using the Batson test, the court examined the totality of the circumstances to reach
its holding with all of the relevant and necessary facts. Because of the clearly egregious pattern
of the state’s prosecutor, the Supreme Court upheld a Batson violation, and reversed and
remanded the case.94 Because Flowers was an indication to the Court that the Batson test was not
working, it is both an example of the ever-present racial biases in the courtroom and the struggle
of enforcing justice for African American defendants.

91

Id. at 2247.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 2244.
92
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IV.

Research on Juror Decision Making

Research in juror decision making has focused on a number of factors that make the penalties
for African American defendants harsher than those imposed for the same crime by a white
defendant.95 Some of these include juror race, victim race and strength of evidence.96 Research
recorded by the Bureau of Justice Statistics showed that although the number of white men and
black men on death row is fairly equal, the population of free black men compared to the
population of black men on death row is severely disproportionate.97 While African Americans
account for forty-two percent of the men on death row, only thirteen percent of American
citizens are black men.98 Those percentages should be more similar, but they are not similar
because of the implicit biases of jurors in trials across the country.99

Defendant Race
Of the few studies that have focused on race and juror decision making, many rely on
entirely white participants, which presents significant issues in generalizability of these
findings.100 By implementing an experimental design that includes only part of the jury pool, the
outcomes of the studies were significantly shifted the because the studies give a limited and
narrow perspective on juror decision making. Three studies, however, display the effects of this
kind of study well: Sweeney and Haney in 1992, Mazzella and Feingold in 1994, and Bowers,

95

David M. Flores, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Capital Juror Decision Making: An Empirical
Examination, 55 (May 2010).
96
Id. at 55.
97
Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Capital Punishment, 2017: Selected Findings 1 (2019).
98
U.S. Census Bureau QuickFacts: United States 1 (2018); See also NAACP Death Penalty Fact Sheet (2017).
99
Jack Glaser, Karin D. Martin, Kimberly B. Kahn, supra, note 1 at 539.
100
Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL CRIM. PSYCHOL. 171 (2007).
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Sandys, and Brewer in 2004. Sweeney and Haney studied exclusively white participants.101 Two
years later, Mazzella and Feingold conducted a study that included white and black participants;
however, participants were divided into two test groups based on their race.102 Lastly, Bowers,
Sandys, and Brewer conducted a study in 2004 that involved both black and white participants
who previously served together on real trials rather than mock trials.103
Sweeney and Haney conducted fourteen studies involving almost three thousand
participants to investigate the effect of juror race on sentencing.104 Their study was a metaanalytic review of experimental studies.105 As for methodology, the study was limited to only
white participants.106 The variable that changed was defendant race: trial transcripts indicated
either a white defendant or a black defendant.107 To complete this study, mock jurors were
provided with trial transcripts.108 Participants were instructed to make decisions about guilt and
make sentencing recommendations.109 The study altered the defendant’s race and altered whether
the case was interracial in a small amount of cases.110 All fourteen studies taken into
consideration for Sweeney and Haney’s meta-analysis were conducted within the United States.
At the conclusion of reviewing the fourteen studies, there was a significant finding that showed

101

Id. at 173.
Id.
103
William J. Bowers, Marla Sandys, Thomas W. Brewer, Crossing Racial Boundaries: A Closer Look at the Roots
of Racial Bias in Capital Sentencing when the Defendant is Black and the Victim is White, 53 DePaul L. Rev. 1499
(2004).
104
Samuel R. Sommers, Race and the Decision Making of Juries, 12 LEGAL CRIMINOL PSYCHOL 173 (2007).
105
Laura T. Sweeney, Craig Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytical Review of
Experimental Studies, 10 BEHAV. SCI. & THE L. 173 (1992).
106
Id. at 183.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id. at 184.
102
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an anti-black tendency in white mock jurors.111 These jurors tended to recommend a longer and
harsher sentence to African American defendants than to the white defendants used in the
study.112 However, the authors noted that although this is true, the racial discrimination is not
solely against black defendants; the unrealistic standard of culpability is often attributed to the
members of any dissimilar race, not just African American defendants.113 Overall, the results of
the study confirmed the hypothesis that white mock jurors tend to hand out harsher sentencing
penalties to African American defendants.114
The study conducted by Mazzella & Feingold was quite similar with one significant
difference: the studies included participants of all races.115 Included in that study were around
6,700 people.116 In this study, to contrast from Sweeney and Haney, racial bias was not
significant, masked in part by the guilt factor of a racially diverse study group.117 Effect size
shows the statistical significance between two factors for testing. In these studies, the effect size
was a mere .06, showing that racial bias was highly insignificant and showed little effect on
decision making.118 The Mazzella and Feingold study is a prime example of the positive effects
of a diverse jury composition when compared to the study completed by Sweeney and Haney.
Lastly, the study completed by Bowers, Sandys and Brewer shifted the perspective from
sentencing decisions to juror making decisions. This is the most recent study of the three
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discussed. The data for this study was received form the Capital Jury Project.119 This project
interviewed jury members who served on capital trials across the country.120 Fourteen states were
included: Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Missouri, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.121 This study set itself
apart from others when it utilized raw data from jurors that served on real trials rather than mock
jurors, significantly increasing its credibility and applicability. A little over one thousand
participants’ information was used in this study from a total of three hundred and fifty-three
trials.122 As part of the interviews, jurors were asked about their descriptions of the defendant,
feelings about the defendant’s family, how the defendant regarded his family, their consideration
of mitigating circumstances, and their responses to levels of aggravation.123 The study concluded
that white jurors were more likely to view African American defendants as dangerous and
unlikely to feel guilty for their actions.124 This was specifically true for white male jurors, 63.3%
of whom viewed black defendants as more dangerous.125 White jurors were also less likely to
consider mitigating circumstances in coming to their conclusions throughout trial by a fortypoint difference between white jurors and black jurors.126 This finding is statistically significant
by a p value of .054.127 Black male jurors, on the other hand, were more likely to feel empathy
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for the defendant and the defendant’s family by a thirty-point difference between black male
jurors and every other subject category.128 The study overall had more realistic and accurate
responses than any other study as they included participants who sat on a legitimate trial, rather
than listening or reading a mock trial.
While some studies yield statistically insignificant results, others find a strong probability
of white juror bias when it comes to decision making. However, the majority of studies agree
that juror race has some effect on juror decision making, almost always a negative one for
African American defendants. The effects of jury composition have yet to be studied extensively
and would tend to replicate the study conducted by Bowers, Sandys and Brewer as they are one
of the few studies on juror decision making to take into consideration data from both black and
white participants. An even smaller amount of data has been collected on jurors of races that are
not black or white, such as Latinos or Asian-Americans. This research should be conducted in
the future to expand the true impact of a defendant’s race on juror decision making.

Victim Race
Another factor that researchers have focused on to assess juror decision making is the race of
the victim. Based on research conducted by the Death Penalty Information Center, there have
been two hundred and ninety-one executions where the defendant was black, and the victim was
white since 1976.129 When those are reversed, the statistics are shockingly low in comparison. Of
all of the cases where there have been white defendants perpetrating a black victim, there have

128
129

Id. at 1513.
Executions by Race and Race of Victim, DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER 1 (2019).

24

been only twenty-one executions – a statistic that is one hundred and thirty-nine percent lower
than the rate at which juries execute black defendants convicted of killing white victims.130
In 2004, Holcomb, Williams and Demuth conducted a study to investigate the effects of a
victim’s race on death penalty sentencing.131 The result of the study showed that white female
victims were disproportionately represented in cases where defendants were given the death
penalty when compared to their actual number of homicides.132
The focus of the Holcomb, Williams and Demuth study was narrow, including only
homicides in Ohio. The data was gathered from the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s
Supplemental Homicide Reports from 1981-1997.133 After analyzing the sentences and
demographics for each case, they found disparity in how defendants of any race who kill white
victims and black victims were punished. Defendants who were prosecuted for killing white
victims were 1.766 times more likely to receive the death penalty than non-white victims.134 This
finding was statistically significant (p < .01).135 A defendant who kills a black male victim has
only a twenty-two percent chance of receiving the death penalty, which is seventy-eight percent
less than a white female victim. 136 To contrast, black victims are less likely to receive the justice
than white victims receive through sentencing.137
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Strength of Evidence
The final factor most often studied by sociologists involves the quantity of evidence admitted
at trial. This factor is a control factor, and it is presumed that in cases where evidence is the
strongest, jurors can confidently rely on the information in front of them.138 In cases where
convincing evidence is lacking, jurors may resort to other factors to render their decisions.139
Regardless of how much trial is offered by the prosecution and defense at trial, the basis of every
trial is evidence. The evidence of a trial will make or break a case. The strength of evidence is
important to jurors and tends to effect whether the defendant’s race will become an extralegal
factor.140
In 1979, Ugwuegbu completed a study showing the impact of strength of evidence on juror
decision making.141 Until Ugwuegbu’s study, strength of evidence was not a control factor
studied extensively.142 Studies have been completed in civil cases or in general criminal cases,
but not with regards to the effects of strength of evidence on racial biases in juror decision
making.143 Both black mock jurors and white mock jurors participated in this study; however, the
two test groups remained separate.144 The variables included the defendant’s race, the victim’s
race and the strength of evidence.145 Ugwuegbu studied whether the lack of culpable evidence
would result in mock jurors relying on race in determining outcomes.146 Ugwuegbu conducted a
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controlled experiment with two different study groups.147 Group one involved two hundred fortyfour white undergraduate students while group two involved one hundred eighty-six black
undergraduate students.148 By creating these subject groups, interracial juror decision making
was not studied.149
The first experiment involved only white undergraduate students.150 The control group was
given a scenario involving race-neutral case briefs and asked to analyze the culpability of the
defendant.151 The results showed only one significant effect that skewed the results: sex of the
participant.152 Males tended to need more evidence to come to conclusions about culpability in
the control group.153 In experimental portion of the study, the mock jurors read different case
briefs with different variables throughout the groups.154 The crime used throughout the study was
aggravated and forcible rape of a girl, with the race of the defendant and victim shifting
throughout the different study groups.155 One of the variables included strength of evidence.156
Strength of evidence was evaluated by creating three categories: near-zero, marginal, and
strong.157 Near zero was defined as a trial with minimal evidence that the defendant in fact
committed the crime that he was being charged with.158 Questions were raised as to whether the
defendant was guilty through a prosecution witness stating that the defendant was not the person
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who committed the assault.159 Marginal evidence was defined as doubtful evidence that was
created by introducing a positive victim identification and testimony of the defendant’s persistent
denial of committing the crime.160 Strong evidence was defined as a positive victim
identification, police testimony of a confession, and the defendant testifying that the victim was
“asking for it.”161 The results showed that when evidence is at one extreme, either strong
evidence or close to no evidence, the defendant’s race played little to no role in determining
culpability.162 However, the level of evidence that was marginal altered the way jurors perceived
the defendant’s culpability.163 When there is some, but not enough evidence, black defendants
become more likely to be found culpable than white defendants.164 These results were found to
be statistically significant (p < .05).165 However, this experiment included only white
participants.166
The second experiment included only black undergraduate student participants.167 Every
other aspect of the experimental study was identical to the first experiment.168 The results of the
second experiment were not inconsistent with the results of the first experiment. When evidence
was marginal, black mock jurors tend to find white defendants more culpable than black
defendants.169 However, there was one difference between the results of the white mock jurors
and the black mock jurors. Black mock jurors, in addition to finding white defendants more
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culpable when there is marginal evidence, granted less harsh decisions of culpability, even when
there was strong evidence against the black defendants.170 This result was statistically significant
(p < .05).171

Liberation Hypothesis
In 1966, researchers Kalven and Zeisel developed a theory aimed at explaining jury
decisions that resulted in racial disparities: the liberation hypothesis.172 According to this
hypothesis, when the evidence in a case is contradictory, confusing, or weak, jurors feel
“liberated” to look to extra-legal factors to make their verdict and sentencing decisions.173 The
main extra-legal factors studied that tend to affect juror decisions were the race of the defendant,
the race of the victim, and the severity of the case.174
Twenty-two years after the liberation hypothesis was created, Barnett, a researcher set out
to apply the liberation hypothesis to capital cases, developed a scale to quantify the seriousness
of cases.175 When ranking capital cases, Barnett categorized the variables into three groups: the
level of certainty jurors have that the defendant is guilty, characteristics of the victim, and the
severity or heinousness of the crime.176 The results of Barnett’s study showed that in cases where
jurors could be confident in their decisions, the effects of the white victim/ black defendant dyad
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were not significant.177 To contrast, in cases where the evidence was contradictory or weak,
racial disparities in sentencing became significant.178 Barnett’s study confirmed Kalven and
Zeisel’s liberation hypothesis by showing that when evidence was marginal, jurors looked to
extralegal factors.179
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V.

Reforming Jury Selection in Capital Cases

As findings of racial biases continue to emerge in sociolegal research, it becomes jarringly
apparent that a solution must be found to address these problems including the impacts of
defendant race, victim race, and strength of evidence at trial. As recently as 2000, scholars have
focused on reducing racial biases in jury selection.180 A few solutions have emerged that may be
quickly and effectively implemented in capital cases across the country: diverse jury composition
and simplified jury instructions.181 Most importantly, an implicit bias test was created that can
help protect African American defendants from juror biases that the average juror would not
admit to willingly.

Diverse Jury Composition
One factor significantly alters the likelihood of an African American defendant being sent to
death row – jury composition.182 The Supreme Court has noted this as an important factor for
consideration when creating a fair trial when deciding Batson v. Kentucky in 1986.183 As written
by Justice Powell in the opinion for Batson v. Kentucky,
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will not
exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race, or on the
false assumption that members of his race as a group are not qualified to serve as
jurors.184

180

William J. Bowers, Benjamin D. Steiner, Marla Sandys, Death Sentencing in Black and White: An Empirical
Analysis of the Role of Jurors’ Race and Jury Racial Composition, 3 J. OF CONST. L. 174-274 (2001).
181
Id. at 174.
182
David M. Flores, Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in Capital Juror Decision Making: An Empirical
Examination 66 (May 2010).
183
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 80 (1986).
184
Id. at 80.

31

In 2001, Bowers, Steiner and Sandys conducted a study on jury composition’s effect on
sentencing outcomes to confirm the data already presented on death sentence reform. 185 The
study was based on the Capital Jury Project, which interviewed trials across the country,
including 1,115 jurors from a total of fourteen states.186 By using this data, the study was
completed with a statistically significant population whose answers are highly credible as each
participant was an jury member on a real trial rather than being a mock juror. The study
pronounced two statistically significant patterns with regards to jury composition:
1. A jury composed of a white majority is associated with a higher likelihood of receiving a
death penalty in black defendant/white victim cases.
2. A jury composed of at least one black juror tended to increase the likelihood of imposing
a life sentence as opposed to a death sentence.187
When it comes to jury composition, these are two main effects that greatly impact the
outcome of a trial and sentencing are consistent from study to study.188 These are known as the
“white male dominance” and the “black male presence” effects.189 When the number of white
male jurors remains at four, the likelihood of a death sentence is fairly low – a twenty-three
percent chance; however, when that number changes from four to five white male jurors, there is
a forty-point increase, making it sixty-three percent likely that the defendant will be sentenced to
death.190 This is known as the white male dominance effect.191 The black male presence, on the
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other hand, has the opposite effect. Although not as significant of an increase as the white male
dominance, the introduction of one black male juror increases the likelihood of a life sentence by
thirty-four percent.192
Simplified Jury Instructions
Multiple studies note a second factor as greatly impacting what leads jurors to
disproportionately sentence African American defendants to the death penalty: incomprehensible
jury instructions.193 Although studied since the late seventies, there is still an overwhelming level
of complexity to jury instructions that inhibits a jury’s ability to accurately and effectively render
verdicts in capital cases.194 The study included one hundred and twenty participants, including
fifty-eight white participants and sixty-two non-white participants.195 All participants were jury
eligible.196 The researchers hypothesized that racial bias would be reduced against black
defendants in participants who received simplified jury instructions.197 Those who received a
standard version of jury instructions would, in theory, be more likely to impose the death
sentence.198 The independent variables included in the study were defendant race and type of
jury instruction, the standard instruction or the simplified instruction.199
The results of the study confirmed the researchers’ hypotheses: when jurors were given the
standard jury instructions that were more complex and harder to understand, they were more
192
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likely to impose the death penalty.200 Not only was it less likely that jurors imposed the death
penalty with the simplified instructions, but the simplified instructions also reduced the racial
disparity that occurs between white jurors and black jurors.201 When the jurors used simplified
instructions, the difference in sentencing patterns between white and non-white jurors
disappeared almost entirely when deciding what sentence should be imposed for a black
defendant.202

Implicit Bias Testing

While many studies on juror decision making focus on racial biases exhibited by jurors
during voir dire, explicit bias is unlikely to be the sole cause of racial discrimination during
capital trials.203 Instead, researchers now look to implicit bias for answers on why racial
disparities occur throughout verdicts and sentencing.204 Implicit bias, as opposed to explicit bias,
is an unconscious attitude towards a certain type of person based on assessment of a person’s
characteristics.205 These types of biases tend to stem from stereotypes and cognitive processes
throughout one’s life.206 Because these attitudes are unconscious, they pose a different type of
danger to African American defendants; they are difficult to identify and eliminate through jury
selection.
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In 1998, a group of scientists founded Project Implicit, a research organization aimed at
studying implicit biases.207 Through their work, the Implicit Assessment Test (IAT) was created
to identify participants’ unconscious biases.208 While taking the test, participants categorize
adjectives with either a good or bad connotation with concepts, race in this case.209 The test is
meant to be taken as quickly as possible so that participants do not have time to think about what
belongs there, which would instead indicate explicit bias.210 Since the year 2000, courts have
used the Implicit Assessment Test one hundred and twelve times in different parts of trial and
sentencing.211
The research gained from those cases confirmed the researchers’ hypothesis about racial
implicit bias being alive and well in the criminal justice system.212 Mark Bennett, a U.S. District
Court judge, is a prime example of the Court making attempts at eliminating implicit bias.213 In
2010, Judge Bennett began using the Implicit Assessment Test with jurors by explaining the test
and encouraging jurors to take the test and take the results into consideration throughout the
course of trial.214 Since he began this practice, Judge Bennett advocates for acknowledging and
attempting to eliminate implicit bias through the Implicit Assessment Test.215
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VI.

Conclusion

In 1972, the Court began to review the death penalty within the context of the Eighth
Amendment for African American defendants. By holding in Furman v. Georgia that the death
penalty could not be applied in a way that is not arbitrary or discriminatory, the Court showed
that African Americans could not be treated differently throughout the process of the criminal
legal system.216 However, this decision was evidently not sufficient to curtail discrimination in
jury selection.
The Court took the first step in reforming jury selections, in Turner v. Murray, by holding
that jury selection that questioning of potential jurors on their racial biases may be permitted.217
The Court decided this holding due to “the fact that the crime charged involved interracial
violence…and the special seriousness of improper sentencing in a capital jury case.”218
Justice for African American defendants occurs when jury composition reflects an actual jury
of one’s peers – not a jury dominated by white men that is hand-picked by prosecutors. The key
to reforming the criminal justice system for African Americans is allowing a jury composition
that reflects not only the majority, but also the minorities of their community. To do this, the
Supreme Court must allow voir dire based on racial prejudice and remand district level trials that
exclude African American jurors. Furthermore, Court should impose a ban on juries that are
composed of exclusively white jurors. Lastly, before the jury is sworn, judges should explain and
administer the Implicit Administration Test to prospective jurors. In doing so, judges could
minimize the influence of implicit bias within capital trials for African American defendants and
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allow these defendants a fairer trial. When the courts mandate these solutions in capital trials, our
legal system will be one step closer to ending the disproportionate discrimination against African
American defendants.
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